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A Preface to Constitutional Theory*
David Lyons**
We have a plethora of theories about judicial review, including
theories about theories, but their foundations require stricter
scrutiny. This Essay presents some aspects of the problem through
an examination of two important and familiar ideas about judicial
review.
The controversy over "noninterpretive" review concerns the
propriety of courts' deciding constitutional cases by using extraconstitutional norms. But the theoretical framework has not been
well developed and appears to raise the wrong questions about
judicial review. Thayer's doctrine of extreme judicial deference
to the legislature has received much attention, but his reasoning
has been given less careful notice. Thayer's rule rests largely on
doctrines of doubtful constitutional standing.
The purpose of this Essay is not so much to answer questions
as to raise them-to enlarge the agenda of constitutional theory.
I.

INTERPRETIVE REVIEW

Constitutional scholarship has recently employed a distinction
between "interpretive" and "noninterpretive" review, which concerns the range of norms used by courts in deciding constitutional
cases. As the term suggests, "interpretive review" is based on
interpretation of the Constitution; "noninterpretive review" is
not so limited, but uses other grounds as well. Thus the normative
theory that is labelled "interpretivism" accepts only interpretive
review, whereas "noninterpretivism" approves of noninterpretive
review in some cases.
These differences concern the core responsibilities of courts
engaged in judicial review. They are not limited, for example, to
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crisis conditions, when courts might be thought to have special
reason for departing from their normal role. They apply primarily
to review by the federal judiciary of decisions made by other
branches of the federal government. The role of those courts
relative to decisions made by state governments is often treated
differently.
The distinction was introduced by Grey in the following terms:
In reviewing laws for constitutionality, should our judges confine
themselves to determining whether those laws conflict with norms
derived from the written Constitution? Or may they also enforce
principles of liberty and justice when the normative content of
those principles is not to be found within the four corners of our
founding document?'
How useful is the distinction? According to Grey, the "chief
virtue" of "the pure interpretive model" is that
when a court strikes down a popular statute or practice as unconstitutional, it may always reply to the resulting public outcry: "We
didn't do it-you did." The people have chosen the principle that
the statute or practice violated, have designated it as fuhdamental,
and have written it down in the text of the Constitution for the
2
judges to interpret and apply.
That seems false. Rarely could a court truly defend an unpopular
decision by saying to a protesting population "We didn't do ityou did." Only small minorities of the population have been
permitted to participate in the processes leading to ratification
of the Constitution and most of its amendments. Most members
of those privileged minorities are no longer alive when the
provisions are enforced. Such a defense would rest on fictions.
But let us consider the theoretical framework on its merits.
Grey argues that, when engaged in judicial review, "the courts
do appropriately apply values not articulated in the constitutional
text."3 He might appear to win that argument too easily. For his
initial definition of the distinction seems to limit interpretive
review to norms that are explicitly given ("articulated") in the
constitutional text. That would make the "interpretivist" a straw
man.

1. Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
2. Id. at 705.

3. Id.
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Scholars accept that constitutional norms need not be stated
in the document, but can be attributable to the Constitution on
the basis of sound interpretative argument. Relatively uncontroversial examples include checks and balances, the separation
of powers, and representative government. While it seems plausible to hold that some such norms are "derived from the written
Constitution," they are not treated as if they have been fully
"articulated in the constitutional text." They themselves require
interpretation.
Grey's initial definition of interpretive review is misleading,
but its narrowness is relieved by his acknowledgment that "sophisticated" interpretivism "certainly contemplates that the courts
may look through the sometimes opaque text to the purposes
behind it in determining constitutional norms. Normative inferences may be drawn from silences and omissions, from structures
and relationships, as well as from explicit commands." 4 There is
also evidence that Grey accepts "Framers' intent" as a criterion
of constitutional meaning. 5 He appears to regard the intentions
of the Framers as implicit codicils to the constitutional text. This
might expand its "normative content" considerably.
Constitutional lawyers seem to agree that Framers' intent
helps determine constitutional meaning. This is, however, a blind
spot of constitutional theory. The criterion of Framers' intent
desperately requires clarification and justification. Its fundamen6
tal difficulties have largely been ignored.
Its difficulties notwithstanding, if Framers' intent is assumed
to be a determinant of constitutional meaning, then that affects
the interpretive-noninterpretive distinction. Interpretation, and

4. Id. at 706 n.9. Grey goes on, however, to say:
"What distinguishes the exponent of the pure interpretive model is his insistence
that the only norms used in constitutional adjudication must be those inferable
from the text."
The entire passage makes sense only. if we suppose that "the purposes behind"
an "opaque text" can be "inferable from the text." That may be true in some cases.
5. See, e.g., id. at 710.
6. The central problems do not concern mere practical difficulties in applying the
criterion, such as limited evidence, but its inherent ambiguity and arbitrariness. See, e.g.,
Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981), and Lyons, Constitutional
Interpretationand OriginalMeaning, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 75 (1986). It may be too early
to say that these criticisms of the criterion have been ignored, for they have appeared
only recently. Nevertheless, some of the central difficulties were in effect indicated by
MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966).
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therefore interpretive review, is then taken to encompass norms
that can be inferred from the text of the Constitution or from
the intentions of its Framers. Noninterpretive review includes
norms with no such connections to the Constitution.
To understand the distinction better, we have to consider
Grey's application of it. He appears mainly concerned with defending decisions based on "those large conceptions of governmental structure and individual rights that are at best referred
to, and whose content is scarcely at all specified, in the written
Constitution. '' 7 These are especially important and interesting
norms; but it is misleading to regard their use as noninterpretive
review.
Consider the fifth amendment's requirement of "just compensation" for private property that is taken for public use.s As the
Constitution explicitly requires compensatory justice but provides no criteria of just compensation, it is most natural to
understand the clause as requiring compensation that is truly
just. If it does, then the Constitution presupposes that there is
a real distinction between just and unjust compensation, one that
people can employ.
On this reading, compensatory justice is a constitutional norm.
But it is only named; its content is not given. What are we to
say, then, about the appropriate criteria of compensatory justice
and their use by courts? The question is forced on us by Grey's
framework, which is intended to put such provisions in proper
perspective. Should the criteria of compensatory justice be classified as extraconstitutional norms and their use regarded as
noninterpretive because they are given neither by the constitutional text nor by Framers' intent? That would be misleading,
because appropriate criteria are needed by courts in applying
the constitutional norm of compensatory justice. That fact provides a powerful reason for regarding the identification of appropriate criteria as an element of constitutional interpretation.
Courts cannot identify appropriate criteria of compensatory
justice without answering this question: "What does justice require by way of compensation when private property is taken

7. Id. at 708.
8. The occasion for compensation (public takings of private property) will be assumed
hereafter.
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for public use?"9 A justified answer would seem to require a
systematic inquiry into the principles of compensatory justice.
Criteria that are appropriate for constitutional purposes might
depend not only on abstract justice but also social conditions,
historical traditions, established economic practice, and prior constitutional interpretation. It is commonplace for courts to make
such judgments.
Constitutional scholarship often describes such a process as
judges imposing their own values on the nation. This assumes
either that there cannot be justified answers to moral questions
or else that judges are incapable of honest inquiry. But either
form of skepticism is incompatible with our subject, the rational
appraisal of normative theories about judicial review.
We are properly skeptical about criteria that are proposed
without clear justification. There can also be room for doubting
the results of an inquiry. But I,see no reason to deny that courts
might sometimes have adequate reason to regard certain criteria
of compensatory justice as appropriate. A court's deciding a case
on that basis could not be regarded as unfaithful to the Constitution. Quite the contrary.
Working out such aspects of the Constitution surely counts as
interpretation. The interpretive-noninterpretive distinction obscures this point and directs us to the wrong questions. We need
a better understanding of constitutional interpretation. We need
to explore the variety of ways in which a norm can legitimately
be attributed to the Constitution.
To suggest otherwise is to invite misguided criticism. When
constitutional interpretation is so narrowly understood, the idea
of noninterpretive review does not distinguish between norms
that lack any connection with the Constitution and norms that
are firmly anchored in it, though they require interpretation.
Then critics can fail to appreciate the distinction.10 Plausible
objections to the former can mistakenly appear to discredit the
latter as well.
Let us now consider briefly another prominent account of the
distinction between interpretive and noninterpretive review. According to Ely, interpretivism holds

9. A sound answer might differentiate among takings.
10. See, e.g., Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981).
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that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the
written Constitution [whereas noninterpretivism maintains] that
courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce norms
that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the document.1
Ely attacks this "clause-bound"' 12 interpretivism, using arguments
like those already suggested. It treats "constitutional clauses as
self-contained units"'3 and does not envisage interpretive claims
based on several provisions or the Constitution as a whole. "On
candid analysis," he says, "the Constitution turns out to contain
provisions instructing us to look beyond their four corners."' 4 He
finds these instructions in "provisions that are difficult to read
responsibly as anything other than quite broad invitations to
import into the constitutional decision process considerations that
will not be found in the language of the amendment or the
debates that led up to it."'" Unlike Grey, Ely does not endorse
noninterpretive review. But he avoids it only by renouncing his
own definitions.
Interpretive and noninterpretive review are defined by both
Grey and Ely so as to encompass the possible varieties of judicial
review. Ely's attack on noninterpretivism is directed, however,
against theories that do not exhaust the possible varieties of that
type. He attacks what one might call purely noninterpretive
review, which seeks "the principal stuff of constitutional judgment in one's rendition of society's fundamental values."' 6 This
leaves unscathed those versions of noninterpretivism that base
judicial review on interpretations of "the document's broader
themes," including Ely's theory. Ely defends a "participationoriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review.'"17 According to his own definitions, that theory recommends
noninterpretive review. In nevertheless calling his theory "the
ultimate interpretivism, '"', Ely acknowledges that the interpre-

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 88, note *
Id. at 38.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 88 note *
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88.
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tive-noninterpretive distinction incorporates an inadequate conception of interpretation.
Ely's analytic framework is misleading, 19 and his method of
interpretation is impressionistic. He claims, for example, that the
Constitution overwhelmingly endorses representative democracy
and that its unclear elements should be interpreted so as to
promote that value. He recognizes that aspects of the Constitution cannot be encompassed by this interpretation, but he fails
to explain the impact of the recalcitrant evidence on his interpretative claims or its consequences for judicial review. Should
we regard the Constitution as committed also to principles that
are independent of representative democracy? If so, how are
unclear aspects of the Constitution to be understood when the
two sets of principles conflict? Alternatively, should the Constitution be regarded as committed to some more complex set of
principles, which coherently account for all of its provisions? Ely
rejects the narrow conception of interpretation that is assumed
by the standard idea of interpretive review, but he never clarifies
his own conception of interpretation, and so neglects these issues.
In sum, the interpretive-noninterpretive distinction has been
unhelpful. It begs the central question of judicial review, namely,
the character of interpretative claims and the range of sound
supporting arguments.
There is a genuine problem about whether and, if so, when
and how extraconstitutional norms may properly be used within
judicial review. But that problem can hardly be addressed before
we achieve an understanding of interpretative claims that are
based on what Ely calls "the broader themes" of the Constitution.20

19. I discuss this point in Lyons, Substance, Process, and Outcome in Constitutional
Theory, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (1987).
20. Another problem is to clarify the subject of interpretation. The standard formulations quite naturally imply that it is a document. (A rare exception is Llewellyn, The
Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).) But interpretative arguments
routinely consider not only "Framers' intent" but also the requirements of institutions
that accord with the structural norms of the Constitution (see, e.g., C. BLACK, STRUCTURE
AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969), which is frequently cited but whose
intriguing theoretical claims about interpretation have never been carefully analyzed or
clearly explained) and interpretative judicial precedent. Grey defends "noninterpretivism"
by relying heavily on established lines of precedent. Like judicial review itself, Ely's own
theory starts from an interpretative precedent and relies on precedents throughout.
Dworkin maintains that constitutional interpretation concerns not just the constitutional
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II.

THAYER'S RULE

According to Thayer's famous "rule of administration" for
judicial review, federal courts should nullify federal legislation
only when one cannot reasonably doubt that it is unconstitu21
tional.
This extreme doctrine of judicial deference does not seem to
be motivated by skepticism about the constitutional basis for
judicial review. Thayer appears to believe that judicial review is

justified on the ground that Congress has "only a delegated and
limited authority under the [Constitution, and] that these restraints, in order to be operative, must be regarded as so much
law; and, as being law, that they must be interpreted and applied
by the court." 22 Thayer emphasizes that judicial review concerns
the constitutional boundaries of legislative authority rather than
the wisdom of the legislature's exercise of its authority and that,
as a judicial power, it may be exercised only within the context

of litigation in which constitutional questions arise. 23
Against that background, one might expect Thayer to reason
that courts should approach the task of reviewing legislation for
its constitutionality by seeking a well-grounded understanding of
the relationship between the Constitution and the legislation
under review. This would require a court to base its decision on
interpretations of legislative authority and its limits under the
Constitution as well as of the challenged statute.

document but "our constitutional structure and practice." See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
360 (1986).
21. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893) [hereinafter Thayer, Origin]. The rule is formulated in a variety
of ways, but the variations make no difference here. As explained below, the rule applies
to relations between the judiciary and the legislature at the federal level.
22. Id. at 138; see also id. at 129-130 (on the supremacy clause).
23. Thayer contrasts the limited range of cases in which the courts are authorized to
"review" legislation for constitutionality with the unlimited scope for review by the
legislature. He claims that the legislature cannot act without making such a judgment,
and that its judgment may be final, as many of its acts cannot be reviewed by courts.
He reasons that, by placing limits on the scope of judicial review, the system implies
that the legislature is primarily to be relied upon to review legislation for constitutionality,
and that the legislative judgment is entitled to respect. Id. at 134-136. This "may help
us to understand why the extent of [the judiciary's] control, when they do have the
opportunity, should be narrow." Id. at 137. But the same might be said about state
legislatures and legislation, so Thayer's reasoning does not seem to square with the
different treatments he accords federal and state legislation.
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Thayer does, in fact, insist upon that straightforward approach
to judicial review, but only when federal courts review legislative
enactments by state governments. In those cases, Thayer says,
courts should be guided by "nothing less than" the "just and
true interpretation ' 24 of the federal Constitution. But Thayer
insists that the same does not hold when courts review federal
25
legislation; courts should approach those cases very differently.
Thayer observes, in effect, that two questions must be distinguished. One is whether legislation comports with the Constitution. Another is how courts should deal with challenges to the
constitutionality of legislation. These might be assumed to run
together. Indeed, there would seem to be a very strong presumption that an answer to the former question (Is this statute
constitutional?) determines the appropriate answer to the latter
(Should this statute be upheld as constitutional?). But Thayer
holds, in effect, that federal courts should not be guided by any
such presumption in dealing with federal legislation. In those
cases, courts should not be guided by their best interpretation
of the statutes and the Constitution. They should not ask whether
the legislation is constitutional, but whether the courts should
sustain it as constitutional. Courts should answer that question
by determining whether someone might reasonably believe that
the legislation is constitutional. If so, the constitutional challenge
should be denied and the legislation upheld. If not-if "it is not
open to rational question" 26 whether the act is unconstitutionalthen, but only then, should the courts nullify it.
Courts following Thayer's rule might never have occasion to
declare unconstitutional legislation unconstitutional. Judges might
confidently believe, on excellent grounds, that an enactment
exceeds Congress' legislative authority and is therefore unconstitutional, but they might simultaneously believe that their
excellent reasons for regarding the enactment as unconstitutional
leave room for reasonable doubt. Thayer understands, of course,
that the rule requires greater deference to congressional deci-

24. Id. at 155.
25. Thayer does not adequately explain why different treatment is to be accorded state
and federal legislation. He asserts that the courts have a duty to maintain the "paramount
authority" of the national over the state governments (!d. at 154), but all he adds is that
the federal iegislature is, whereas state legislatures are not, "co-ordinate" with the federal
courts. Id. at 155.
26. Id. at 144.
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sions than would otherwise be warranted. But that is not my
present concern.
My point is that the rule requires justification. Judicial review
(as Thayer himself appreciates) is grounded upon the idea that
the Constitution is law that courts are bound to apply and enforce.
This implies a very strong presumption that courts should nullify
legislation that they regard as unconstitutional. Thayer would
seem to be claiming that in some, but not all, cases federal courts
should not straightforwardly apply and enforce the federal Constitution, and thus that in those cases this presumption is rebutted. His conception of a federal court's responsibility when
reviewing legislation from one of the state legislatures shows
that he understands what it means for the courts to apply and
enforce the Constitution. He accordingly owes us an explanation
of how the presumption in question is rebutted - how courts can
legitimately refrain from applying and enforcing the Constitution
generally, with regard to congressional as well as state legislation.
An answer might make either of two possible claims. It might
claim that there are constitutional grounds for judicial deference
to the legislature in such cases, or it might invoke extraconstitutional grounds. The difference is significant. Whereas an answer
of the first type would raise issues of constitutional interpretation, an answer of the second type would raise issues of principle
regarding judicial fidelity to the Constitution.
Thayer appears to recognize that the burden of proof lies on
his shoulders, and he attempts to sustain it both by offering
evidence that his rule reflects the standard view 27 and by sug-

gesting substantive grounds for the rule. The latter arguments,
citing the rule's merits, are presented in quotations from others'
writings. But Thayer appears to endorse their points, so I shall
proceed as if they represent his considered judgement. The main
issue for constitutional theory is not what Thayer himself believed but the character of such reasoning.
I shall now review the suggested arguments in the order in
which they are suggested in Thayer's paper:

27. Thayer's claim that his rule was firmly established is systematically appraised and
rejected in C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 195-203 (1960).
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Utilitarianism

Thayer submits that unless the courts limit nullification to
violations of the Constitution that are "plain and clear .... there
might be danger of the judiciary preventing the operation of
2
laws which might produce much public good."
This argument is offered tentatively, perhaps because it is
incomplete. After all, courts nullifying federal legislation may
prevent public harm as well as public good. A complete argument
of this type would need to show that following his rule would do
more good than harm, perhaps even that it would do more good,
on the whole, than any feasible alternative, including less deferential rules.
But the argument might be bolstered. To avoid circularity and
vacuity, let us interpret "public good" as general welfare. It
might be held that a reasonably accurate measure of the general
welfare is provided by an indirect majoritarian decision process
such as that provided by a popularly elected legislature. If so, it
might be held that a policy of judicial deference to a popularly
elected legislature would promote the general welfare.2
Let us then suppose that Thayer's rule can be supported by
utilitarian reasoning. This does not appear to count as a legal,
or specifically a constitutional, argument. How can it legitimately
guide a court's approach to judicial review? How can it legitimately limit a court's application and enforcement of the Constitution? An answer might be based on constitutional or
extraconstitutional considerations. After all, either the Constitution implies that utilitarian reasoning may permissibly guide a
court's approach to judicial review or it does not.
There is a clear textual basis for claiming that the Constitution
acknowledges the validity of utilitarian reasoning, though not to
the exclusion of all potentially competing considerations. The
preamble says that the Constitution is meant to "promote the
general Welfare," 30 among other things. The. values cited in the
28. Thayer, Origin, supra note 21, at 140 (quoting Kemper v. Hawkins, Va. Cas. p. 60
(1793)).
29. The argument provides no apparent basis for deferentially reviewing federal legislation while rigorously reviewing legislation of the several states. The same is true of
other arguments considered here, but I shall ignore them hereafter.
30. I ignore here the differences and possible conflict between promotion of the general
welfare when that is limited to the population of the United States and promotion of
welfare more generally.
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preamble might be understood to have a bearing upon constitutional interpretation. It might be held, for example, that the
Constitution as a whole should be interpreted so as to promote
those values. This reasoning would not justify the promotion of
the general welfare without regard to the other values cited, but
it would legitimize the use of utilitarian arguments, among others,
in large scale constitutional interpretation.
But this would not tend to show that the utilitarian argument
for Thayer's rule has a constitutional foundation. From the assumption that the Constitution as a whole is supposed to promote
a certain value, and that the Constitution as a whole may be
interpreted accordingly, we cannot reasonably infer that the same
is true of specific aspects of the Constitution. That would amount
to what logicians call "the fallacy of division." Besides, institutions
do not work that way. Law, in particular, promotes various values
indirectly.
If a utilitarian argument for Thayer's rule is to be regarded
as constitutional, what needs to be shown is that the Constitution
implies a utilitarian condition on the exercise of the judicial power.
Consider the parallel case for legislation. Suppose we ask whether
the failure of a statute to promote the general welfare is a
constitutional ground for nullification of the statute. Thayer's
answer would be no: the Constitution provides no utilitarian
condition on the exercise of the legislative power. But the same
applies to adjudication: we have no reason to believe that the
Constitution implies a utilitarian condition on the exercise of the
judicial power. If that is true, then a utilitarian argument for
Thayer's rule cannot be regarded as based on the Constitution.
If the first suggested argument for Thayer's rule has no foundation in the Constitution, then the argument is extraconstitutional. 31 We return to our original question: How can such
reasoning legitimately guide a court's approach to judicial review?
The general problem is this. Legitimate legal arguments vary
among jurisdictions, but are usually thought to be limited. Judicial review itself assumes that there are limits to the judicial
power to nullify legislation. Some reasons are relevant (the statute is unconstitutional); others are not (the statute is unwise).
31. It is then an argument that a self-styled "interpretivist" should reject. If "judicial
activism" in this area involves the use of extraconstitutional norms, then this is an
activist argument for judicial deference.
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But if some arguments with no foundation in the Constitution
are to be regarded as a sound basis for some judicial decisions
(such as whether a court should adopt Thayer's rule), then those
limits on legal arguments are threatened. Must courts then be
guided by other extraconstitutional and even extralegal arguments- without restriction, in all judicial contexts? If not, then
what is the basis for selecting some and rejecting others?
The first argument for Thayer's rule does not begin to answer
such questions, but perhaps we have delved deeply enough to
suggest some conditions on, and thus some obstacles to, its
successful completion. Let us turn, then, to another suggested
argument for Thayer's rule.
B. Respect for the Law
Thayer next posits that the courts should insure "due obedience" to the federal legislature's authority. If its authority is
"frequently questioned, it must tend to diminish the reverence
for the laws which is essential to the public safety and happi3
ness." 2

This suggests that, by rigorously enforcing the Constitution,
courts might undermine respect for federal legislation, which in
turn might undermine public safety and happiness. The argument
assumes both that federal rule is essential to public welfare and
that it is quite fragile. Thayer seems to assume that extreme
judicial deference can not only bolster federal authority but is
an essential means to that end.
It may be difficult for us to regard the federal government as
fragile, but the idea might have seemed more plausible when
Thayer wrote, not very long after the Civil War.
In any event, the argument may be understood in either of
two ways. We might emphasize its reference to "public safety
and happiness" and read it along utilitarian lines. This would
introduce nothing new into our deliberations, so I turn instead
to an alternative reading. The argument might be understood to
presuppose a principle that seems plausible, if somewhat vague:
the judiciary shares responsibility to make the system work.

32. Thayer, Origin, supra note 21, at 142 (quoting Adm'rs of Byrne v. Adm'rs of
Stewart, 3 S.C. Eq 466, 476 (S.C. 1812)).
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The principle is implausible unless the judiciary's share of the
responsibility is limited, for example, to "judicial" functions. Even
if our conception of the judicial role is flexible, it is not coextensive with our conceptions of the other governmental branches.
Questions that then arise are whether the adoption of such a
rule is in fact compatible with the judicial role and, if so, whether
its adoption is in fact necessary to make the system work.
For our purposes, however, the most important question is
whether the principle that is presupposed by the argument (e.g.,
that the judiciary shares responsibility to make the system work)
has any foundation in the Constitution. It is tempting to suppose
so, but I see no clear argument to that effect. Another possibility
is that the principle expresses a conception of civic responsibility,
which might be classified as moral rather than legal. Implementing the notion of civic responsibility in this way seems less
threatening to the idea of limits on law than does similar use of
utilitarian reasoning. Whereas application of the notion of civic
responsibility is limited to political or similar contexts, utilitarian
reasoning is not.
C. Independence of the Judiciary
Thayer fears that "[t]he interference of the judiciary with
legislative Acts, if frequent or on dubious grounds, might occasion
so great a jealousy of this power and so general a prejudice
against it as to lead to measures ending in the total overthrow
of the independence of the judges, and so of the best preservative
of the constitution. 38
This argument is likewise premised on the judiciary's responsibility to help make the system work, as well as on fears that
ill-considered or even "frequent" judicial nullification of legislation might provoke Congress to use its considerable power to
control the federal courts. There is of course some irony in an
argument that seems to counsel sacrificing the Constitution in
order to save it. Put more sympathetically, however, the claim
is that rigorous enforcement of the Constitution might be selfdefeating.
This argument may be contrasted with Learned Hand's later
justification for judicial review. Both writers emphasize the im33. Id.
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portance of preserving the constitutional scheme that separates
powers and allows one branch of government to limit the effective
discretion of another. Both urge judicial deference to the federal
legislature. Beyond that, however, they differ profoundly. Thayer
appears reasonably confident of the constitutional basis for judicial review, but is concerned that vigorous exercise of the
judicial power might be self-defeating. Hand seems deeply skeptical of judicial review's grounding in the Constitution, and argues
that it was necessary for the judiciary to assume the power in
order to "keep the states, Congress, and the President within
34
their prescribed powers."

D. Representative Government
Finally, in a passage whose principal point is to emphasize the
degree of judicial deference that is due the federal legislature,
Thayer suggests a further argument:
It must indeed be studiously remembered, in judicially applying
such a test as this of what a legislature may reasonably think,
that virtue, sense, and competent knowledge are always to be
attributed to that body. The conduct of public affairs must always
go forward upon conventions and assumptions of that sort. "It is
a postulate," said Mr. Justice Gibson, "in the theory of our government... that the people are wise, virtuous, and competent to
manage their own affairs. .. ." And so in a court's revision of
legislative acts ... it will always assume a duly instructed body;

and the question is not merely what persons may rationally do
who are such as we often see, in point of fact, in our legislative
bodies, persons untaught it may be, indocile, thoughtless, reckless,
incompetent,-but what those other persons, competent, well-instructed, sagacious, attentive, intent only on public ends, fit to
represent a self-governing people, such as our theory of government assumes to be carrying on our public affairs,- what such
persons may reasonably think or do, what is the permissible view
for them.... The reasonable doubt [of unconstitutionality].., is
that reasonable doubt which lingers in the mind of a competent
and duly instructed person who has carefully applied his faculties
to the question. The rationally permissible opinion of which we
have been talking is the opinion reasonably allowable to such a
person as this. 5

34. L. HAND, THE BILL oF RIGHTS 15 (1958).
35. Thayer, Origin, supra note 21, at 149 (emphasis in original).
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This passage can be understood to serve two functions. On the
one hand, it is designed to clarify the rule of judicial deference
to the federal legislature. According to the clarified rule, congressional acts may be nullified when, and only when, they are
unconstitutional beyond "that reasonable doubt which lingers in
the mind of a competent and duly instructed person who has
carefully applied his faculties to the question."
On the other hand, it suggests a further ground for the rule.
Thayer suggests that the Constitution embodies "a theory of
government." He does not state the theory, but it appears to
include the following elements: the theory assumes (1) "that the
people are wise, virtuous, and competent to manage their own
affairs," and (2) that they do so through representatives who are
"competent, well-instructed, sagacious, attentive, [and] intent only
on public ends." This appears to anticipate the notion that our
government embodies or is committed to political principles which,
because they favor "self-government"- or the closest practical
approximation, government by elected representatives -argue
against interference by an unelected federal judiciary. Although
the point is not clearly made, it is nonetheless worth pursuing
for its continuing importance.
This fourth suggested argument for Thayer's rule is similar to
Alexander Bickel's contention that judicial review is "countermajoritarian" and "undemocratic."3 6 Bickel puts the point by
saying that, because judicial review "thwarts the will of the
representatives of the actual people of the here and now," it is
"a deviant institution in the American democracy." 37 These points
are understood to provide reasons against judicial nullification of
legislative decisions. As judicial review is established in the
system, those points are understood to provide reasons for limiting such interference with the operations of representative gov38
ernment.

36. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-17 (1962). See also, Rehnquist, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, 64 TEX. L.J. 695-697 (1976).
37. BICKEL, supra note 36, at 18.
38. Thayer's reference to "the theory of our government" is problematic. The quoted
passage implies that he treats essential elements of the theory as fictions. He does not
believe that the elected legislators are generally "fit to represent a self-governing people,"
and one suspects that, for similar reasons, he does not believe that the people are fit to

govern themselves.
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But what kinds of reasons are they supposed to be? Are they
provided by the Constitution? If not, we might ask, once again,
why we should suppose that they should be taken into account
in the deliberations of courts that are charged with the application and enforcement of constitutional law.
Consider the following facts: First, Thayer suggests that the
power of judicial review can be inferred from the Constitution;
Bickel claims that judicial review is neither implicit in nor contrary to the Constitution. s3 As both writers appreciate, the practice is well entrenched within the system. So, neither writer
claims that judicial review is excluded by the Constitution and
both acknowledge that it is established practice. Second, both
writers understand that the Constitution neither prescribes nor
permits pure popular government or even unrestricted representative government. The Constitution prohibits a variety of decisions that might be made by elected representatives. The
constitutional system has various counter-majoritarian features.
As both writers recognize, the constitutional system is not unqualifiedly committed to representative democracy. In sum, even
if judicial review clashes with principles of representative democracy, that would not show that it clashes with the principles
of the system that we have.
Perhaps the idea is that the Constitution is somehow committed
to an ideal of representative democracy, despite its countermajoritarian features. This raises a question that is rarely addressed in the literature of constitutional theory: What kind of
reasoning is capable of justifying the attribution of normative
political principles, including political ideals, to the Constitution?
What would make a theory of that kind true? Political principles
are often attributed to the Constitution, but on what basis is
never made clear. For that reason, it is unclear what inferences
might be drawn from, or what applications might be made of,
those principles within the context of constitutional interpretation.
Compare Bork's conception of the Constitution. Although Bork
refers to "the seeming anomaly of judicial supremacy in a democratic society," he says that the anomaly is "dissipated ...by

39. It is unclear whether Bickel means that the Constitution is indeterminate on this
issue, and also whether he believes that judicial precedent nonetheless imposes an
obligation to engage in judicial review.
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the model of government embodied in the structure of the Constitution."40 That model is "Madisonian," and "one essential premise of the Madisonian model is majoritarianism. The model has
also a counter-majoritarian premise, however, for it assumes
there are some areas of life a majority should not control." 41 Bork
claims that both "constitutional theory" and "popular
understanding" 42 provide an adequate basis for judicial review
by giving courts the task of clarifying the boundary between
majority power and minority freedom.
Because it acknowledges that the system limits representative
government, Bork's "Madisonian model" seems descriptively more
accurate than Bickel's "majoritarian" model. This might lead one
to infer that Bork's model is superior. But these "models" are
not purely descriptive. They are meant in part to show why the
constitutional system merits respect. And such a model's descriptive accuracy need not improve its qualifications as an ideal.
Even if the majoritarian model is descriptively less accurate than
the Madisonian model, some might think that it nevertheless
embodies a superior ideal. They might argue that pure representative government is better than a Madisonian system because
43
it is inherently fairer or better serves the general welfare.
III.

CONCLUSION

The relatively brief career of the "interpretive model" for
judicial review suggests the difficulty of containing the practice
of constitutional interpretation within the narrow confines of
textual glosses and psychohistory. Legal theory resists the notion
that interpretation might be both controversial and sound, for
its ideal of law is black letter. Anything short of certainty is
dubious law. But interpretive practice in law, as elsewhere, seeks
both hidden and wider meanings. A good deal of "noninterpretive" review turns out to be interpretational after all.
There are limits to the range of legal and specifically constitutional meanings, and so the imaginative practice of constitutional interpretation obliges us to consider the various grounds

40.
41.
42.
43.

Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
Id. at 3.
Id.
This might be Bickel's view.

IND.

L.J. 2 (1971).
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upon which norms can properly be attributed to the Constitution.
But the reasoning behind doctrines like Thayer's rule, which
aspire to regulate constitutional adjudication, appears not to
respect those boundaries. Is that a sign that civic responsibilities
lie just beyond the law? Or does it reflect undisciplined theorymongering, constitutional infidelity masquerading as "judicial restraint"?
We end, as promised, with questions.

